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This paper analyzes the impact economic perceptions have on social preferences and 
whether this impact has changed during the course of the Great Recession. I begin by 
documenting the development social preferences and economic perceptions take during the 
period analyzed (2002-2014). In the crisis year almost all of these variables exhibit a 
decreasing trend. There have been evidences in the literature for a stark impact of economic 
perceptions on a multiplicity of attitudes. However, the analysis of the development of this 
impact during a recession represents a gap in the literature. My findings underline the 
powerful role economic perceptions play on three branches: Trust in policy, immigration and 
redistribution. During the Great Recession the impact of assessments of the economy did 
mostly stay stable, while economic self-assessments had a significantly increasing impact. 
Given the increased anxiety during times of economic turmoil, it is no surprise that the 





Esta tese analisa o impacto de percepções económicas em preferências sociais e se este 
impacto se alterou durante a Grande Recessão. Começo por documentar o desenvolvimento 
das preferências sociais e percepções económicas durante o período 2002-2014. Nos anos de 
crise, quase todas estas variáveis apresentam uma tendência de queda. Tem sido 
documentado na literatura que as percepções económicas têm um forte impacto numa 
miríade de atitudes. No entanto, o desenvolvimento deste impacto durante o recessão não 
foi, até agora, estudado. As minhas conclusões realçam a elevada importância das 
percepções económicas em três áreas: confiança em políticas, imigração e redistribuição. 
Durante a Grande Recessão, o impacto de percepções económicas sociotrópicas manteve-se 
relativamente estável, enquanto que percepções financeiras e económicas tiveram um 
impacto acrescido. Dada a crescente ansiedade durante períodos de incerteza económica, 
não é surpreendente que o impact de percepções económicas egocêntricas em preferências 
e atitudes sociais se tenha intensificado. 
 
 
Table of Content 
1. Introduction 
     
  





    
1 
2. Motivation 
    
2 
3. Data and Methodology 
    
  
3.1 Data 
    
3 
  
3.2 Methodology A 
  
12 
    
3.2.1 Baseline Model 
 
13 
    
3.2.2 Non-Linear Probability Model 14 
    
3.2.3 Parallel Regression Assumption 14 
    
3.2.4 Kernel Density Functions 14 
4. Results 
      
  
4.1 The Impact of Economic Perceptions on Social Preferences and Attitudes 


















The Impact of Economic Perceptions on Social Preferences and Attitudes 
during the Great Recession 
    
4.2.1 Methodology B 
  
      
4.2.1.1 Wald Test 25 
    
4.2.2 Results 
   
      
4.2.2.1 Politics 26 
      
4.2.2.2 Immigration 30 
      
4.2.2.3 Redistribution 32 
5. Conclusion 
    
33 
6. Appendix 
      
  
6.1 Appendix A: Description of Variables 36 
  
6.2 Appendix B: Tables 
  
38 
7.  Bibliography 





List of Tables 
Table 1 Development of means of main variables of interest 7 
Table 2 Development of means of the socio economic control variables 11 
Table 3 
The effect of assessments of the economy on attitudes in politics and 
redistribution 
17 
Table 4 The effect of economic self-assessments on Politics and Redistribution 19 
Table 5 








The effect of the Great Recession on the impact of assessments of the economy 
on trust in national and European parliaments 
27 
Table 8 
The effect of the Great Recession on the impact of economic self-assessment on 
trust in national and European parliaments 
29 
Table 9 Composition of sample 38 
Table 10 
The effect of assessments of the economy on trust in the European parliament 
sorted by region 
39 
Table 11 Gini Coefficient in Europe 40 
Table 12 
The effect of the Great Recession on the impact of assessments of the economy 
on satisfaction with democracy and redistribution 
41 
Table 13 
The effect of the Great Recession on the impact of economic self-assessments 
on satisfaction with democracy and redistribution 
41 
Table 14 




The effect of the Great Recession on the impact of assessments of the economy 
on satisfaction with democracy in the "PIIGS" countries 
42 
Table 16 
The effect of the Great Recession on the impact of assessments of the economy 
on attitudes towards immigration 
43 
Table 17 
The impact of economic self-assessments on social preferences and attitudes in 
2006 and 2012 
44 
 
List of Graphs 
Graph 1 Assessments of the economy: Kernel density functions over time 4 
Graph 2 Trust in parliament vs trust in European parliament density functions 9 
Graph 3 
Comparison of densities of trust in parliament and trust in the European 















1.1 Research Question 
Eight years after the outbreak of the Great Recession, the aftermath is still palpable in many 
European countries, including in the orientation of fiscal policy, in the behaviour of labour 
markets and in the dynamics of the political landscape. Moreover, the Great Recession 
seems to have had a lasting impact in people’s perceptions regarding macroeconomic 
outcomes. This thesis aims at examining whether and to what extent social and political 
preferences of individuals are influenced by their perception regarding economic outcomes. 
In particular, I will analyze the attitudes towards redistribution, immigration, refugees and 
political institutions. Furthermore, I will explore if the Great Recession has changed the 
impact economic perceptions have on these attitudes.  
Academic literature available on the topic investigates the impact of economic perceptions 
on the before described attitudes, but there has not been a paper focusing on bringing all 
these relationships together. Furthermore, the literature for the impact of the Great 
Recession on these relationships is not yet exhaustive; I will try to contribute to close this gap 
in scientific research. I use for this the European Social Survey dataset, which has seven 
biennial waves between 2002 and 2014 for over 30 European countries. This data set is very 
rich; in my regressions I have a sample size of 205,705. This enables me to provide a very 
detailed and precise analysis.  
 
1.2 Outline 
This paper is structured as follows: In the subsequent chapter I will give insight in the 
intellectual process underlying my motivation to do this thesis. In section 3 I will give a 
detailed overview of the analyzed variables, dependent and independent. Furthermore, I will 
present my econometrical approach on how to extract the impact of economic perceptions 
on the variables of interest. In section 4.1 I will give a detailed analysis of the results 
regarding the impact of economic perceptions on social preferences and attitudes and put 
these into relation with the existing literature. In section 4.2 I analyze whether and how 
these impacts changed in the course of the Great Recession. Since to the best of my 








The existing literature is rich and diverse on the impact of economic perceptions on social 
preferences and attitudes. Most papers focus on the impact to one single attitude (Olivera 
(2015), Roth (2009), Stevenson & Wolfers (2011)), while I will recap these relationships and 
focus thereby only on economic perceptions, controlling for socioeconomic, country-, and 
time-fixed effects. The underlying data set is extensive and rich, which allows for a detailed 
research procedure yielding significant results. Furthermore, my motivation lies in recent 
developments concerning the atmosphere of public discussion, as well as the political 
change palpable in Europe.  
In many countries in Europe radical both left- and right wing movements gain an increasing 
amount of supporters and political strength. In the middle and eastern European countries 
radical right-wing parties are on the rise, while in southern European countries, where the 
sovereign debt crisis hit the economy severely, radical left-wing parties gain more and more 
power. These developments seem to stem from the economic turmoil and how this 
economic recession entered in peoples’ minds. I will use trust in parliament and satisfaction 
with the way democracy works as proxy variables to anticipate this development.  
Redistribution of income is a topic in which especially economic self-assessments influence 
the decision process whether to support government intervention or not. Therefore, I will 
also include this relationship into my analysis. The Great Recession had also a European 
dimension due to the sovereign debt crisis, which I try to capture through the trust in the 
European parliament. The crisis seems to have increased nationalistic and protectionist 
attitudes, which result in xenophobic and anti-immigration views. I analyze these attitudes 
towards immigration on multiple levels, and how they get influenced by economic 
perceptions. In the current public debate another influx of foreign people dominates the 
discussions, the so-called refugee crisis. Since this is a recent and ongoing process, I try to 
give some indications how attitudes towards refugees developed, which are crucial in this 







3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1. Data 
The data was collected from the European Social Survey. This survey was conducted in up to 
36 European countries (Including Israel, Russia and Turkey) biennially between 2002 and 
2014 and contains after revising 205,705 observations. This observation size enables me to 
extract very precise and inclusive results. The questionnaire was designed by the Centre for 
Comparative Social Surveys from the City University London. The included countries vary 
over the different rounds; some countries were more often included while others less (cf. 
Table 9). Each year core questions are addressed. Furthermore, there are modules regarding 
specific topics included which change from questionnaire to questionnaire. In the last wave 
of the questionnaire the data set becomes thinner than in the previous years. While the 
number of observations has increased continuously from 24 532 in 2002 to 36 074 in 2012, it 
decreased to 21 742 observations covering 15 countries in 2014. The countries included in 
this last questionnaire are exclusively from eastern and western Europe to which I will refer 
in the following as “core” countries (specifically: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Germany, Estonia, Ireland, France, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden, Norway 
and Switzerland). To ensure robustness of results I ran my regressions firstly on the whole 
data set, including all countries, and then only on the “core” countries, which were available 
also in 2014. The results are very similar. 
I will use the names of the variables as they appear in the European Social Survey.   
The two main explanatory variables are: assessment of the current status of the economy, 
corresponding to the question: On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of 
the economy in [country]? (00-Extremely dissatisfied; 10-Extremely satisfied) and economic 
self-assessment, corresponding to: Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to 
how you feel about your household's income nowadays? (01- Living comfortably on present 
income; 02- Coping on present income; 03- Finding it difficult on present income; 04- Finding 
it very difficult on present income). This differentiation between the two economic 
assessments enables me to research a possible asymmetry in the impact of economic 
evaluations. Since the assessments of the status of the economy vary heavily within a 
country, the question rises how these perceptions are determined.  
Duch et al. (2000) question the usage of aggregated data on economic perceptions, since 
individual levels’ biases reflect on the aggregated level. They argue that agents’ economic 
perceptions are influenced by their “political predispositions, personal financial experiences, 
socioeconomic situation, and level of understanding of the economy” (p. 649).  This bias on 
the individual-level does not cancel out when the data is aggregated as usually assumed in 
economic voting models. For these models of voting this finding can be detrimental. In my 
analysis however, it does not influence the validity of the results. Furthermore, these biases 
do only apply to assessments of the status of the economy, while economic self-assessments, 
or economic well-being, are not touched by it.  
Dickerson (2015), Gerber & Huber (2010) and Wlezien et al. (1997) agree on the effect 
partisanship has on economic perceptions, indicating that supporters of the incumbent party 
rate the economy more favourably than others. Moreover, Dickerson (2015) points out the 
increased impact of presidential approval on economic perceptions during the Great 
Recession. Chzhen et al. (2013) analyze the same relationship and come to a contradicting 
conclusion: Economic perceptions especially in times of recessions have a significant impact 
on presidential approval, while in times of economic growth the impact gets reversed.  
 
Graph 1: Assessments of the economy: Kernel density functions over time (2002-2012) 
 
Notes:  Assessments of the Economy is scaled from 0-10. For further variable specification please refer to Appendix A.  

















Density of Satisfaction with Economy over time




There is a controversial academic debate on this topic, which is still in progress and became 
more vivid with the experience the Great Recession provided.  
The developments of the means of both economic assessments show an interesting pattern 
(cf. table 1). The assessments of the country’s economic situation display a sharp decline in 
2008, which represents the start of the economic crisis, and maintain values on a significant 
lower level until 2012 than prior. The structure of answers is displayed in graph 1. The three 
density curves for the pre-crisis period are easily distinguishable from the three crisis years 
2008, 2010 and 2012.  
The values reached before the crisis seem to have recovered in 2014, but this result is mostly 
due to the altered data set in the 2014 questionnaire, which I mentioned above. In turn, the 
assessments of the own economic situation also deteriorate between 2006 and 2008 and 
stay on this more negative level in the subsequent years. But comparing these two 
developments reveals that the economic assessment of the status of the economy got 
affected much more by the crisis, than economic self-assessments.  
The main analysis in this thesis aims at uncovering the impact of these economic perceptions 
on a set of different social and political attitudes. I organize my regressions into four 
branches of interest: Trust in policy, attitudes towards redistribution, immigration and 
refugees.  
For the policy component of my research I analyze three different questions in the European 
Social Survey: Firstly, trust in parliament: How much do you personally trust in [country]'s 
parliament? (00- No trust at all; 10- Complete trust), secondly, trust in the European 
parliament: How much do you personally trust in the European Parliament? (00- No trust at 
all; 10- Complete trust) and thirdly, satisfaction with democracy: On the whole, how satisfied 
are you with the way democracy works in [country]? (00- Extremely dissatisfied, 10- 
Extremely satisfied). Since this crisis was also a crisis of European institutions and their 
relationship to the national political institutions is still a constant object of discussion, it is of 
considerable interest how they are affected by economic perceptions and how this impact 
changed in the course of the crisis. Analyzing citizens’ relationship to the national parliament 
yields a reliable proxy for citizens’ attitudes towards democratic institutions within their 
country. To complete this picture of attitudes towards policy and democracy, I included the 
variable satisfaction with the democracy in [country]. I am aware of the ongoing debate on 




formulated a comprehensive article. They argue that the meaning of this variable lies in the 
dimension of these three interpretations: “Support for authorities, system support, and 
support for democracy as a form of government” (p. 525). Linde & Ekman (2003) follow this 
line of argumentation, but admit that usage of the democracy variable is valid when analyzed 
over time, since the development has some explanatory potential. The sort of diffuse 
support of the incumbent system the democracy variable reflects, explains its’ strong 
dependence on economic considerations. Considering recent developments in Europe, but 
also in the US, mistrust against the so-called ‘establishment’ is emerging in many countries. 
Support for the system seems to vanish slowly away in the last years. However, looking at the 
data, this is not the case. Table 1 offers descriptive statistics regarding all the dependent and 
independent variables of interest.  The variable satisfaction with democracy, which can take 
values from 0 to 10 (0 represents a very dissatisfied person), is very stable in the pre-crisis 
years. In 2008 and 2010 it diminishes, while in 2012 the satisfaction with democracy 
increases again in direction to the pre-crisis level. This development reflects the crisis years, 
but other variables analyzed respond to the Great Recession in a much more significant 
fashion. Furthermore, satisfaction with democracy remains on a relatively higher level than 
the other policy variables.  
Trust in parliament declines over the whole period analyzed, but especially sharp with the 
beginning of the economic crisis in 2008. The variable recovers slightly in 2012 and in 2014 
the recovery seems to be complete. But after considering the limitations of the 
questionnaire in 2014, this result is not valid. Looking at the mean development of trust in 
parliament, when referring only to the “core” countries, yields stagnation over the whole 
period. This diverging development within Europe outlines the complexity and diversity the 
effects of the crisis on political trust inhibit. Torcal (2014) argues that the decline of political 
trust in Portugal and Spain in 2010 and 2011 depended mainly on corruption, elitist 
misbehaviour and the lack of responsiveness of politicians to the peoples’ concerns. 
However, Stevenson & Wolfers (2011) analyze trust in public institutions over the business 
cycle and come to the conclusion, that the recent decrease in trust is heavily dependent on 
macroeconomic outcomes. Furthermore, they refuse the hypothesis “this time it’s different” 
when claiming that the stark increase of mistrust in the US may only be a cyclical response. 
They base this conclusion on the analysis of cross-country data sets, and the link of rising 




Erkel & Van der Meer (2016) investigated the development during the crisis in European 
countries. Following their argumentation, political trust is not based on macroeconomic 
performance when compared to other countries. They argue that the within-country 
comparisons with past performances have a great impact on people’s trust in public 
institutions.  
The European parliament is viewed differently by respondents and therefore, the trust in it 
follows a different pattern than the trust in country specific parliaments. The ability of 
people to distinguish between political institutions on national and supra-national level has 
been debated especially with reference to the European Union. While it has been common 
sense for a long time, that agents are not able to make distinction, a new set of scholars 
argues, that especially among the higher educated the ability to do so is indeed there. 
Hobolt’s (2012) findings indicate a positive relationship between “regime support at the two 
levels of government” (p.101), referring to the national and supranational level.  
Table 1 
Development of means of main variables of interest  
 
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Explanatory variables 
Assessment of the economy 
4.71 4.97 5.36 4.03 4.15 4.31 5.22 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Economic self-assessment 
1.84 1.93 1.90 2.03 2.07 2.06 1.79 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Dependent variables 
Trust in national parliament 
5.14 4.88 4.79 4.49 4.17 4.29 4.97 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Trust in the European parliament 
4.76 4.68 4.72 4.65 4.41 4.51 4.40 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Redistribution 
2.29 2.26 2.21 2.17 2.11 2.09 2.26 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Immigration: Economy 
5.10 4.91 5.13 4.97 4.81 5.04 5.13 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Immigration: Country 
4.90 4.89 4.98 4.96 4.86 5.11 5.26 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Immigration: Culture 
5.93 5.66 5.69 5.57 5.41 5.72 5.87 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Refugees 
3.28 
     
2.88 
(0.01) 
     
(0.01) 
Satisfaction with democracy 
5.66 5.60 5.54 5.11 5.03 5.43 5.67 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Notes: For specification of variables, please refer to Appendix A. The variable “Refugees” is only included in the 





However, when looking more closely to the development of the means, this supposed close 
relationship vanishes. Between 2002 and 2008 the mean remains on the same level, 
followed by a drop in trust in 2010, from which the variable never recovers. When 
investigating solely the western and eastern European countries, excluding the southern 
periphery, the development is very similar to the development including all countries. 
Therefore, it is possible to evaluate the ESS wave of 2014 and its respective mean as a valid 
approximation for the other countries. This implicates a lasting effect on trust in the 
European parliament, contrary to trust in national parliaments. This result opposes also the 
findings of Armingeon & Ceka (2013), who conclude that support for European institutions is 
closely tied to support of national institutions. Nonetheless it has to be said that the data set 
analyzed by them only included the years 2007-2011. Yet following the treatment of the 
sovereign debt crisis, the European institutions have a severe trust problem. Braun & 
Tausendpfund (2014) find that support for the European Union declined in all 27 EU member 
states between April 2007 and November 2012. Furthermore, they conclude that “the 
impact of the Euro crisis on EU support is stronger than the impact of the global crisis” 
(p.242). This is consistent with the drop of the mean of trust in the European parliament in 
2010 contrary to the decrease of trust in parliament, which occurred in my data sample two 
years earlier. The difference in nature between the two kinds of trust becomes even more 
visible when looking at Graph 2. Trust in the European parliament exhibits a much higher 
density when evaluated at the most neutral point (=5), which may be caused by a poorer 
ability of respondents to evaluate the European parliament. 
 
The analysis regarding immigration is divided into three questions, which I code as it follows: 
Firstly, Immigration: Economy, Would you say that it is generally bad or good for [country]'s 
economy that people come to live here from other countries? (00- Bad for economy; 10- 
Good for economy), secondly, Immigration: Country, Is [country] made a worse or better 
place to live by people coming to live here from other countries? (00- Worse place to live; 10- 
Better place to live) and at last Immigration: Culture, Would you say that [country]'s cultural 
life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? 
(00- Cultural life undermined; 10- Cultural life enriched). I chose to divide the immigration 
part in order to encounter the diverse aspects of immigration, which may be evaluated 
differently by agents. 
Graph 2: Trust in parliament vs trust in European parliament density functions 
 
Notes:  Both variables are scaled 00-10. For further variable specification please refer to Appendix A.  
 Kernel density function, Gaussian specification, bandwidth=0.5. For further information refer to Methodology A. 
 
The economy component is directly related to possible economic outcomes and is linked 
most closely to my main explanatory variables of economic assessments. The second 
variable, Immigration: Country, is displaying the more general attitude of respondents 
towards immigration. While with the last variable, Immigration: Culture, I try to examine the 
pure xenophobic effect respondents may develop in the course of a bad economic condition. 
No one would really deny the enriching impact immigration has on the cultural life in a 
country, besides xenophobically motivated. This is also the reason why Immigration: Culture 
is expected to be the least affected by a bad assessment of the economic performance. 
Nevertheless, as all immigration variables it displays a small decrease during the crisis years. 
Interestingly when only analyzing the “core” countries, both Immigration: Culture and -
Economy show a decrease between 2002 and 2014, while Immigration: Country exhibits an 
increase. This demonstrates the variety of aspects people consider when forming their 
attitudes towards immigration. Goldstein & Peters (2014) identify minor changes during the 
Great Recession as well: They explain these alterations of attitudes with how “the recession 
was affecting their economic security” (p.29). Dancygier & Donnelly (2013) point out the 
negative effect of a deterioration of economic conditions on attitudes towards immigration 
as well. They break down the working population in sectors and come to the conclusion that 
attitudes towards sector-level immigration are similarly shaped in high-skilled and low-skilled 















skilled workers outweighs the influx of high-skilled workers in most European countries, the 
impact of education on attitudes towards immigration is still positive. Hainmueller & Hiscox 
(2007) come to the contradicting conclusion that higher educated workers are more in favour 
of immigration disregarding the skill-nature of the immigrants. They argue that higher 
educated people value cultural diversity higher, have fewer racist sentiments and evaluate 
the effect of immigration on the whole economy more positive.   
 
Using the variable refugees, referring to the question: Some people come to this country and 
apply for refugee status on the grounds that they fear persecution in their own country. 
Please say how much you agree or disagree that: 'the government should be generous in 
judging people's applications for refugee status' (01- Agree strongly; 05- Disagree strongly), I 
try to analyze to what extent economic perceptions shaped the attitudes underlying the 
current policies conducted in Europe. This question was only part in the first and the last 
round of the ESS, 2002 and 2014, and surely it would be very interesting to understand how 
this variable developed in very recent times, but the ESS questionnaire of 2016 is not yet 
published. The mean developed from 3.28 in 2002 to 2.88 in 2014, which corresponds to a 
change towards a more favourable treatment of refugees. This shows that attitudes towards 
refugees are shaped differently compared to attitudes towards immigration. O’Rourke & 
Sinnott (2006) point out this difference in the structure of attitudes, furthermore they 
conclude that refugees, in difference to “normal” immigrants, are not judged based on their 
economic potential.  
 
To evaluate the composition and development of preferences for redistribution I use the 
variable redistribution, which corresponds to the question: The government should take 
measures to reduce differences in income levels. (01- Agree strongly; 05- Disagree strongly). 
The mean shows a decreasing trend over the course of the crisis, which corresponds to a 
higher support for redistributory measures. When only investigating the means of the “core” 
countries, the same direction of the trend is displayed. Olivera (2015) finds a positive 
relationship between the Gini coefficient and preferences for redistribution, which may 
explain this difference of levels between countries of the European Union. The Gini 
coefficient in the “core” Europe tends to be lower than in southern European countries. 




countries averages 2.32 and in the other countries stands at 1.92.  
 
Table 2 
Development of means of the socio economic control variables 
 
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Age 
44.47 44.55 45.58 45.65 46.75 47.06 48.01 
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) 
Age sq/100 
22.63 22.78 23.76 23.83 24.94 25.27 26.21 
(10.26) (9.89) (10.09) (8.83) (9.39) (9.09) (11.93) 
Left-right scale 
5.11 5.19 5.09 5.21 5.17 5.22 5.09 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Years of education 
12.40 12.14 12.79 12.57 12.88 13.05 13.44 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Sex 
0.52 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.50 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Unemployment history 
0.20 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.23 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Born in country 
0.92 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.91 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Member of a minority 
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Notes: For further specification of variables please refer to Appendix A. Gender, Unemployment history, 
Born in country and Member of a minority are all dummy variables. Age sq/100 is the age raised by the 




















3.2 Methodology A 
The literature review raised the question if ordinal, discrete variables can be treated as 
continuous variables, since they are, at least in social surveys, ordinal approximations of 
continuous variables (Winship & Mare, 1984). However, applying linear estimation methods 
as OLS, does not include the possible non-linear structure of the variables, which extracts 
biased results.  
My variables of interest are measured in discrete outcomes, with eleven, five or four distinct 
values. A common way to treat ordered data is to dichotomize it and use different linear 
methods, as OLS or a linear probit model. But since many of my dependent variables have 
eleven distinct values, besides redistribution, I would lose too much information in 
dichotomizing them. Therefore, I use a widely known and used model in analyzing ordered 
discrete data sets: An ordered logit model. An alternative would have been an ordered probit 
model, which is an extension to the linear probit model. This model has been proposed by 
McKelvey & Zavoina (1975) in their fundamental work. They outlined the invalidity of linear 
regression techniques and the advantages of ordered probit models regarding the analysis of 
discrete ordinal variables. I compared my results of the ordered logit model with the ordered 
probit method, and it yielded no significant different results. An ordered logit model is 
estimated using the Maximum-Likelihood method, which is especially valid in large samples 
(Long & Freese, 2003). For a complete and distinct analysis, I divide and categorize my main 
explanatory variables, economic self-assessment and assessments of the national economy, 
into their outcomes. For the assessments of the national economy this results in eleven 
different dummy variables, while for the economic self-assessments four dummy variables 













3.2.1 Baseline model 
The baseline model is taken from Kerr (2014), but modified to fit my purposes. 
  
Baseline model for assessments of the economy: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡0𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡1𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡2𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡3𝑖
+ 𝛽5𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡4𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡5𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡6𝑖
+ 𝛽8𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡7𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡8𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡9𝑖
+ 𝛽11𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡10𝑖 + 𝛽12𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽13𝑙𝑟𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽14𝑢𝑛𝑒3𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽15𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖
+ 𝛽16𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽17𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽18𝑎𝑔𝑒2𝑖 + 𝛽19𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑦𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽20 𝜙𝑐 + 𝛽21𝜂𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Baseline model for economic self-assessment: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖
+ 𝛽5𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑟𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑢𝑛𝑒3𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽11𝑎𝑔𝑒2𝑖 + 𝛽12𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑦𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽13 𝜙𝑐 + 𝛽14𝜂𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Prefi,c,t : Social preference or attitude  
Φc :  Country fixed effects 
ηt :  Time fixed effects 
assessment0i – assessment10i: Assessment of the economy for every answer category 
living comfortablyi, coping oni, difficulti, very difficulti: Economic self-assessment split up for 
  category 
sexi :  Takes value 1 if male 
lrscalei : Self assessment on political left-right scale (00 – extremely left, 10 – extremely 
right) 
une3mi : Takes value if 1 if person was ever unemployed for a period longer than three 
months (excluding currently unemployed) 
borni : Takes value 1 if respondent is born in country 
minorityi : Takes value 1 if respondent considers himself as member of a minority 
agei : Age of respondent 
age2i : Squared age of respondent 








3.2.2 Non-linear probability model 
If I define the distinct outcomes of my dependent variable as m, such that when for example 
regressing for trust in parliament m can take values between 0 and 10, and the maximum 





for m = 1, J − 1 
The odds-ratio is the ratio of the probability that the dependent variable takes values smaller 
or equal than m over the probability that it takes values larger than m. Therefore, the odds-
ratio is valid for all outcomes for the ordinal and discrete variable. This implicates that the 
odds between different categories do not change (Fullerton & Xu, 2012) and therefore that 
the odds do not depend on m. A value greater than 1 implies a positive effect of the 
independent variable, while a value smaller than 1 has a negative impact, conditional on the 
effects of all other variables. Ordered logit models do not have a constant, but cutting points, 
representing the underlying continuity of the discrete dependent variable. The first cutting 
point is equal to the constant when applying a “normal” logistic regression (Long & Freese, 
2003).   
 
3.2.3 Parallel regression assumption 
One of the biggest challenges working with the ordered logit model is a possible violation of 
the parallel regression assumption. This assumption demands that the odds between 
different categories do not change depending on the category to which they are applied. 
In large data sets a violation is very frequent, if not inevitable. Especially having dependent 
variables with eleven distinct values heavily increases the probability of a violation. The 
alternative to the ordered logit model is a generalized logistic regression. I used this model 
on my data set and the outcomes were very similar to my model. Since a generalized logistic 
regression is impractical in interpretation and presentation I chose to stick with the ordered 







3.2.4 Kernel density functions 
In order to make the results of the ordered logit model graphically presentable, I chose to 
use Kernel density functions. The classic alternative would be histograms, but the application 
of those does not allow to apply the weights used in the ESS. Since the results of a social 
survey are only valid when weights applied, I chose to use another method. Kernel density 
functions were designed to treat continuous data, but since I over smoothed the density 
function, it is a valid approximation of the results. The application of the Kernel density 




























In order to give a detailed and structured overview of my results, I present firstly my results 
regarding the pure impact of economic perceptions on social preferences and attitudes. In a 
second step I present the results the Wald tests produced, in order to identify possible 
changes in the impact of economic perceptions on social preferences and attitudes during 
the course of the Great Recession.  
 
4.1 The impact of economic perceptions on social preferences and attitudes 
 
4.1.1 Politics 
To analyze the impact and the development of the impact of economic perceptions on 
political attitudes, I run six different regressions, referring to my three dependent variables, 
trust in [country]’s parliament, trust in the European parliament and satisfaction with 
democracy. Trust in policy in general and especially the trust in national parliament is heavily 
influenced by the assessment of the current status of the economy. As displayed in table 3, 
all of the dummies constructed which correspond to the different levels of economic 
satisfaction are highly significant. For respondents who are very dissatisfied with the current 
economic status, the odds-ratio is 0.023. Therefore, agents who express a very low 
satisfaction with the present state of [country]’s economy have with a very high probability 
less trust in the national parliament. For this evaluation the economically very satisfied are 
the reference, and therefore a very dissatisfied respondent with the current state of the 
economy has with a probability of 98% less trust in the national parliament than a 
respondent being very satisfied with the state of the economy (cf. table 3 column (1)). 
The results for the economic assessments are in increasing order and all consistent with the 
hypothesis, that a lower evaluation of the economy corresponds to lower levels of trust. This 
result is consistent with the literature, as for instance Armingeon & Guthmann (2014) found 
in their analysis of the declining support for national democracies. When regressing for 
egocentrics assessments of the current economic status, the results are also highly significant 
(displayed in table 4, column (1)). In particular, the odds-ratio for the answer ‘living 





Table 3  
The effect of assessments of the economy on attitudes in politics and redistribution  
  
Trust in national 
parliament 














































0.023** 0.088** 0.008** 0.412** 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.016) 
1 
0.052** 0.145** 0.017** 0.524** 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.021) 
2 
0.083** 0.208** 0.030** 0.620** 
(0.003) (0.008) (0.001) (0.023) 
3 
0.129** 0.291** 0.049** 0.694** 
(0.005) (0.011) (0.002) (0.026) 
4 
0.185** 0.390** 0.078** 0.773** 
(0.007) (0.015) (0.003) (0.028) 
5 
0.220** 0.419** 0.103** 0.789** 
(0.008) (0.016) (0.004) (0.029) 
6 
0.337** 0.610** 0.169** 0.897** 
(0.013) (0.023) (0.007) (0.033) 
7 
0.461** 0.735** 0.253** 0.967 
(0.018) (0.027) (0.010) (0.035) 
8 
0.587** 0.854** 0.390** 1.040 
(0.023) (0.032) (0.015) (0.038) 
9 
0.821** 0.972 0.588** 1.129** 
(0.035) (0.041) (0.026) (0.047) 
very satisfied 1 1 1 1 
Demographic variables 
Education 
1.047** 1.030** 1.027** 1.047** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Left-Right scale 
1.026** 1.016** 1.059** 1.173** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Unemployment 
History 
0.873** 0.913** 0.881** 0.772** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Sex 
1.058** 0.865** 1.088** 1.213** 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
Born in Country 
0.869** 0.792** 0.787** 0.943** 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) 
Member of 
Minority 
1.067** 1.084** 1.033 0.887** 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) 
Age 
0.988** 0.952** 0.986** 0.986** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age squared 
1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Note: All regression results in this table are obtained by the ordered logistic model and displayed as odds-ratios. 
The dependent variables in columns (1)-(3) take discrete values between 0 and 10 (where 10 represents the highest 
trust/satisfaction). The redistribution variable takes values from 1 to 5, where 1 corresponds to the highest level of 
agreement to redistribution measures. For further information on all displayed variables refer to Appendix A.  
* Significantly different from zero at 5%-level. ** Significantly different from zero at 1%-level. 









The socioeconomic control or demographic variables have a considerable impact on trust in 
[country]’s parliament. Years of schooling have a positive impact, as well as evaluating 
oneself as being more right-wing. Respondents with an unemployment history exhibit less 
trust as well as respondents being born in the country of their residence. Male respondents 
are slightly more likely to have more trust in the national parliament, than female 
respondents. Members of minorities have higher trust while age plays a negative role when 
trusting the parliament, though the impact is of concave nature, as the interpretation of age 
squared reveals 
Similar to the effect economic perceptions have on trust in [country]’s parliament, a more 
positive evaluation of the current economic status in [country] leads to a higher trust in the 
European parliament. This is in line with the results of Gabel & Whitten (1997); that 
economic perceptions play an important role in determining citizens’ support for a further 
integration. Furthermore - in a more recent analysis of trust in European institutions during 
the Great Recession - Armingeon & Ceka (2013) find a significant influence of assessments of 
the economic status on trust in the European Union. My results follow these findings 
although the relationship is weaker than on national level, but still heavily significant.  
The economic self-assessments there is also a strong relationship between egocentric 
economic assessments and trust in the European parliament. This finding is contrary to Karp 
et al. (2003) who show in their regression that satisfaction with European institutions is 
independent of economic self-assessments, and further that assessments of the economy 
play, especially among the well-educated, a subordinate role. 
As in the case of trust in the national parliament, the economic self-assessments do not have 
the same importance as assessments of the economy. The socioeconomic control variables 
follow the same pattern as in the case of trust in the national parliament, besides that male 
respondents are less likely to trust in the European parliament.  
The dependent variable satisfaction with democracy yields the lowest odds-ratios for the 
explanatory variable of interest assessment of the economy (cf. table 3 column (3)). A 
respondent assessing the economy as being very bad (assessment of the economy=0) is with 
a chance of more than 99% less satisfied with the way democracy works in his country, than 







The effect of economic self-assessments on Politics and Redistribution 
  
Trust in national 
parliament 




































2.305** 2.104** 2.806** 2.414** 
(0.046) (0.042) (0.056) (0.052 
Coping 
1.704** 1.670** 1.976** 1.663** 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.037) (0.034) 
Difficult 
1.326** 1.351** 1.432** 1.274** 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) 
Very difficult 1 1 1 1 
Demographic Variables 
    
    
Education 
1.045** 1.028** 1.025** 1.038** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Left-Right Scale 
1.056** 1.037** 1.092** 1.178** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Unemployment History 
0.828** 0.882** 0.832** 0.809** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Sex 
1.099** 0.894** 1.137** 1.211** 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) 
Born in Country 
0.765** 0.721** 0.678** 0.877** 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) 
Member of Minority 
1.063** 1.097** 1.037 0.923** 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) 
Age 
0.981** 0.949** 0.978** 0.986** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age squared 
1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pseudo R2 0.050 0.019 0.054 0.030 
# Observations 205705 
Notes: All regression results in this table are obtained by the ordered logistic model and displayed as odds-ratios. The 
dependent variables in columns (1)-(3) take discrete values between 0 and 10 (where 10 represents the highest 
trust/satisfaction). The redistribution variable takes values from 1 to 5, where 1 corresponds to the highest level of 
agreement to redistribution measures. For further information on all displayed variables refer to Appendix A. * Significantly 
different from zero at 5%-level. ** Significantly different from zero at 1%-level. 
 
Comparing the regression of trust in [country]’s parliament with satisfaction with democracy 
indicates a stronger impact of economic perceptions on the satisfaction with democracy. This 
finding confirms the results Armingeon & Guthmann (2014) present, who conclude as well 
that the impact of economic perceptions on satisfaction with democracy is more significant 
than on the trust in parliament. This is inter alia caused of the multiple ways the question can 




self-assessments do have a considerable impact as well on the satisfaction with democracy 
(cf. table 4 column (3)). A respondent who can ‘live comfortably’ on his households’ income 
is almost three times more likely to be more satisfied with the way democracy works, than a 
respondent who finds it ‘very difficult’ to live with his household present income.  
The coefficients of the socioeconomic control variables show the same pattern as for trust in 
[country]’s parliament. Interestingly, the years of schooling do not play such a significant role 
as before, but are still significant.  
 
4.1.2 Redistribution 
The variable concerned with attitudes towards redistribution is significantly influenced by 
economic perception. In difference to attitudes towards politics and immigration, economic 
self-assessments dominate the assessments of the economy. The better the respondent 
evaluates his household’s income, the less favourably he evaluates measures taken by the 
government to reduce differences in income levels. Olivera (2015) analyzes this relationship, 
referring to the same data set I use, and finds highly significant values for the economic self-
assessments. He states very precisely that the level of income inequality in a country 
determines heavily the level of preferences for redistribution, which explains the positive 
and highly significant values of the coefficients for the country-dummy variables of Nordic 
countries.  
Alesina & Giuliano (2011) provide an extensive analysis of the determinants of preferences 
for redistribution and identify family income as a key driver. Corneo & Grüner (2000) analyze 
the three effects, which shape preferences for redistribution: the ‘homo oeconomicus 
effect’, the ‘public values effect’, and the ‘social rivalry effect’. They find all three effects 
being significant, and furthermore that the ‘homo oeconomicus effect’ is heavily influenced 
by the economic self-assessment of agents. Other scholars like Cruces et al. (2012), try to 
examine the possible bias agents have when placing themselves in the income distribution. 
After placing themselves on the income distribution, agents were provided with their actual 
position. Agents overestimating their position demanded more redistribution than initially, 
outlining the importance of correct information and the importance economic self-
assessment has in shaping preferences for redistribution. Following the findings of Alesina & 
Guliano (2011), another factor plays an important role, leaving economic perceptions aside. 




explaining redistributional preferences. Alesina & Giuliano (2011) state that the question of 
redistribution is “probably the most important dividing line between the political left and the 
political right” (p.94). Therefore, it is not surprising that the odds-ratio for the left-right scale 
variable is positive and significant.  
Age, having an unemployment history, being born in a country or being a member of a 
minority are all factors which drive people to be more in favour of redistribution. Male 
citizens as well as the better educated are less in favour of redistribution.  
 
4.1.3 Immigration 
All three immigration variables I used show a significant dependence on economic 
perceptions. The assessments of the economy play there a bigger role than the economic 
self-assessments respondents have (cf. table 5 and 6). This relative importance of 
assessments of the economy in contrast to economic self-assessments is in line with the 
results Citrin et al. (1997) find. They present a possible explanation for economic discontent 
raising xenophobic views: The “psychodynamic theory of scapegoating”. This theory argues 
that economic discontent “acts as a trigger for the displacement of anxiety and anger onto 
minority groups” (p.876).  
Besides this relative importance and the theory of scapegoating, the most common way to 
link immigration with economics is inside the framework of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. The 
theory suggests that in low-skilled labour immigration into countries, which are high skilled 
labour abundant, leads to a decrease in wages for low-skilled workers. The findings of 
Malchow-Møller et al. (2008), who analyze the same data set as I do, are in line with this 
theory. They conclude that economic self-interest, such as the opinion ‘immigrants take jobs 
away,’ play an important role in explaining anti-migration attitudes. Furthermore, they find a 
highly significant and negative impact of lower educated people on anti-immigration 
attitudes. Since they are analyzing this relationship using the EU-15 plus Norway, which can 
be defined as ‘rich’ and high skilled labour abundant countries, their findings confirm the 
Heckscher-Ohlin implications. O’Rourke & Sinnott (2005), as well as Mayda (2006), do an 
extensive analysis of anti-immigration determinants and reach to the same conclusion. The 
question, why these findings matter in the framework of an analysis regarding economic 
self-assessments, which is a relative concept, is legitimate. 




why a reference to standard theory is justified. The question was ‘Which of the descriptions 
on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays? (01- 
Living comfortably on present income; 02- Coping on present income; 03- Finding it difficult 
on present income; 04- Finding it very difficult on present income)’, which indicates that 
people of a lower standard of living are more likely to answer three or four.  
There are also scholars like Burns & Gimpel (2000) who argue that stereotypical thinking is 
more important than economic considerations. But nevertheless they do not deny the 
economical component of stereotypes, agreeing on the impact economic perceptions have, 
but concluding that they are much weaker than previously assumed. These findings are 
opposed by Goldstein & Peters (2014) who identify the economic position as being “perhaps 
the most important [...] component of an individual’s attitudes” (p. 399) towards 
immigration.  
The socioeconomic control variables show similarities with their impact on the political 
dimension analyzed. Years of schooling play a much bigger role though than before, as the 
findings of Malchow-Møller et al. (2008) suggest, and the sign of the left-right scale variable 
is reversed, which is intuitive, since the political left-wing is associated with a more open 
society vis-à-vis foreigners. A surprising change is, that male citizens judge immigration more 
favourably than their female counterparts. The age of respondents does not play any role in 
determining attitudes towards immigration. 
 
4.1.4 Refugees 
In the ESS questionnaires of 2002 and 2014 there is a question included asking how 
generously asylum seekers should be treated by the government. I incorporated this variable 
into my model, since in recent times the “refugee-crisis” dominates the political discussion in 
many European countries on the national and European level. The mean developed from 
3.28 in 2002 to 2.88 in 2014, representing considerable change. Interestingly the 
assessments of the economy dominate the economic self-assessments, following the pattern 
I find when regressing the attitudes towards immigration. Furthermore, the relationship 
between economic perceptions and the Refugee variable is much weaker than when 
regressing for immigration variables (cf. table 5 and 6 column (4)). O’Rourke & Sinott (2006) 
argue that in comparison to ‘normal’ immigrants, refugees are not allowed to work (which is 










Economy Country Culture 
  







































 very dissatisfied 
0.138** 0.171** 0.252** 2.576** 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.208) 
1 
0.196** 0.241** 0.310** 2.330** 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.195) 
2 
0.247** 0.303** 0.368** 2.084** 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.159) 
3 
0.303** 0.366** 0.425** 1.889** 
(0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.139) 
4 
0.379** 0.451** 0.499** 1.687** 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.124) 
5 
0.413** 0.486** 0.507** 1.580** 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.114) 
6 
0.541** 0.637** 0.614** 1.405** 
(0.020) (0.024) (0.023) (0.102) 
7 
0.644** 0.713** 0.698** 1.431** 
(0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.103) 
8 
0.736** 0.770** 0.745** 1.355** 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.099) 
9 
0.877** 0.843** 0.849** 1.162 
(0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.096) 
very satisfied 1 1 1 1 
Demographic Variables 
    
    
Education 
1.099** 1.083** 1.103** 0.959** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Left-Right Scale 
0.942** 0.922** 0.904** 1.162** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
Unemployment History 
0.935** 0.958** 1.009 0.950* 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.019) 
Sex 
1.186** 0.973** 0.915** 1.157** 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.020) 
Born in Country 
0.624** 0.559** 0.651** 1.305** 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.043) 
Member of Minority 
1.204** 1.245** 1.213** 0.708** 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.033) 
Age 
1.000 0.999 1.006** 1.029** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Age squared 
1.000 0.999* 0.999** 0.999** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pseudo R2 0.039 0.046 0.051 0.057 
Number of Observations 205705 46274 
Notes: All regression results in this table are obtained by the ordered logistic model and displayed as odds-ratios. 
The dependent variables in columns (1)-(3) take discrete values between 0 and 10 (where 10 represents the 
highest trust/satisfaction). The refugee variable takes values from 1 to 5, where 1 corresponds to a most 
favourable treatment of refugees. For further information on all displayed variables refer to Appendix A.* 
Significantly different from zero at 5%-level. ** Significantly different from zero at 1%-level. 
 
not perceived as competitors in the labour market. Their appearance is hence not 
perceived to pose a direct threat to the economic status of the incumbent 




Since they are not allowed to work, they represent a burden for the welfare system, 
and a worsening of the perceived economic condition can lead respondents to view 
asylum seekers less favourably. 
 
Table 6 





Economy Country Culture 
  



























 Living comfortably 
2.196** 2.132** 1.782** 0.792** 
(0.044) (0.043) (0.036) (0.043) 
Coping 
1.606** 1.649** 1.417** 0.855** 
(0.030) (0.031) (0.026) (0.045) 
Difficult 
1.295** 1.336** 1.203** 0.912 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.051) 
Very difficult 1 1 1 1 
Demographic Variables 
 Education 1.093** 1.078** 1.098** 0.958** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Left-Right Scale 
0.956** 0.934** 0.913** 1.156** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
Unemployment History 
0.933** 0.958** 1.012 0.957* 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.019) 
Sex 
1.207** 0.986 0.926** 1.147** 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.019) 
Born in Country 
0.571** 0.519** 0.609** 1.359** 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.044) 
Member of Minority 
1.222** 1.261** 1.230** 0.716** 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.033) 
Age 
0.997* 0.996** 1.004** 1.031** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Age squared 
1.000* 0.999 0.999** 0.999** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pseudo R2 0.030 0.038 0.047 0.054 
Number of Observations 205705 46274 
Notes: For further specification of variables please refer to Appendix A. Age squared is slightly greater than 1 
and plays therefore a positive role when regressing all four independent variables. The number of observations 




In the ESS questionnaires of 2002 and 2014 there is a question included asking how 
generously asylum seekers should be treated by the government. I incorporated this variable 
into my model, since in recent times the “refugee-crisis” dominates the political discussion in 
many European countries on the national and European level. The mean developed from 
3.28 in 2002 to 2.88 in 2014, representing considerable change. Interestingly the 
assessments of the economy dominate the economic self-assessments, following the pattern 




between economic perceptions and the Refugee variable is much weaker than when 
regressing for immigration variables (cf. table 5 and 6 column (4)). O’Rourke & Sinott (2006) 
argue that in comparison to ‘normal’ immigrants, refugees are not allowed to work (which is 
true at least in some countries or for a certain amount of time) and that they are therefore 
not perceived as competitors in the labour market. Their appearance is hence not perceived 
to pose a direct threat to the economic status of the incumbent population. This explains the 
weak relationship with the economic self-assessments. Since they are not allowed to work, 
they represent a burden for the welfare system, and a worsening of the perceived economic 
condition can lead respondents to view asylum seekers less favourably.  
 
4.2 The impact of economic perceptions on social preferences and attitudes during the 
Great Recession 
 
4.2.1 Methodology B 
 
4.2.1.1 Wald test 
In order to be able to identify a possible change in the impact of economic perceptions over 
the course of the economic crisis I conduct a Wald test. I use the ordered logistic model 
applied previously, but with an altered main explanatory variable. In contrast to my first 
regressions I multiply the economic assessments with the different points in time. Therefore, 
I create dummies time*(economic assessment) in which the economic assessment is already 
categorized in dummies following the different values the variable can take. The ESS was 
conducted in seven waves between 2002 and 2014. For reasons illustrated in chapter 2, I do 
not use the last wave of 2014. Additional to the problem the data poses in 2014, leaving this 
year aside has the advantage that the reference point for the probabilities is the dummy 
corresponding to respondents who are very satisfied with the state of the economy in 2012, 
or respondents facing a very difficult economical time in 2012 respectively. This provides a 
clearer presentation of the results.   
Furthermore, I control for time-fixed effects, accounting for the changes in the dependent 
variable during the crisis. This method yields only an indication on how economic 
perceptions and the corresponding dependent variables interacted on average. To get more 




crossed with time. This yields information about how and if the different categories changed 
their impact. Then I use the Wald test in order to extract whether there were changes in the 
impact of economic perceptions on social preferences and attitudes. I use 2006 as the “pre-
crisis” year, since satisfaction with economy decreases in 2008 already heavily. The fourth 
round of the ESS was conducted between 01.09.2008 and 31.12.2008, which explains the 
heavy response to the economic turmoil. Since I suppose that the formation of social 
preferences and attitudes is a more inert process than the formation of economic 
perceptions, I compare the outcomes of 2006 with 2012 and spare the questionnaires of 
2008 and 2010 out. I assume the formation of social preferences and attitudes to be more 
complete when the hectic beginning of the Great Recession has been overcome. Since I 
assume inertia in the formation of attitudes, I expect to get significant results for the year 
2012. For reasons outlined previously I disregard in this analysis the results obtained for the 






Comparing the odds-ratios of column (1) and (2) of table 7 using the Wald test does not yield 
any difference in odds-ratios for the categories 00-04 of the satisfaction with economy 
variable vis-à-vis trust in parliament. The respondents being more satisfied with the current 
status of the economy (categories 05-08) are significantly more likely in the crisis year of 
2012 to have more trust in the national parliament than their counterparts of 2006.  
Therefore, the respondents in 2012 exhibit a higher or the same probability of having a 
higher trust in parliament, vis-à-vis their assessments of the status of the economy, than the 
respondent in 2006. This indicates that the respondents do not perceive the parliament as 
being the cause of the bad economic situation.  
For economic self-assessments the picture gets reversed. Comparing the odds-ratios of 
column (1) and (2) of table 8 with the Wald test yields significant differences over all 
categories. Respondents in 2006 are therefore more likely to exhibit higher trust in national 
parliament than their counterparts of 2012, vis-à-vis their assessments of their own 





The effect of the Great Recession on the impact of assessments of the economy on trust in national and European parliaments 
  
Trust in national parliament Trust in the European parliament 
  
2006 2012 2006 2012  
  









































0.021** 0.019** 0.124** 0.083** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.007) 
1 
0.051** 0.047** 0.169** 0.128** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.017) (0.012) 
2 
0.079** 0.074** 0.241** 0.202** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.022) (0.018) 
3 
0.120** 0.121** 0.334** 0.292** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.030) (0.025) 
4 
0.182** 0.188** 0.428** 0.404** 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.038) (0.035) 
5 
0.210** 0.243** 0.453** 0.473** 
(0.018) (0.021) (0.039) (0.040) 
6 
0.325** 0.376** 0.652** 0.694** 
(0.029) (0.033) (0.056) (0.059) 
7 
0.436** 0.558** 0.824** 0.865 
(0.038) (0.049) (0.070) (0.074) 
8 
0.563** 0.674** 0.957 1.022 
(0.050) (0.061) (0.083) (0.090) 
9 
0.826* 0.838 1.083 0.994 







Notes: All results were obtained by the application of an ordered logistic regression. The model applied controls for demographic 
determinants and includes as explanatory variables (time*economic assessments) dummies in the periods 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 
2010 and 2012 (2014 is excluded). * Significantly different from zero at 5%-level. ** Significantly different from zero at 1%-level. 
 
For instance, a respondent evaluating his own economic situation as being “difficult” in 2006 
is 1.98 times more likely to have higher trust in parliament than a respondent evaluating his 
own economic situation as being “very difficult” in 2012. A respondent in 2012 with the 
same evaluation of his own economic status (“difficult”) is only 1.39 times more likely to 
exhibit a higher trust in parliament than a respondent who is in a “very difficult” situation. 
Thus the respondents are in 2012 less likely to have more trust in the national parliament 
than in 2012, vis-à-vis their economic self-assessment.  
 
When evaluating the impact of the Great Recession on the impact of economic assessments 
on trust in the European parliament, the results change considerably when compare to trust 
in national parliament. Column (3) and (4) of table 7 reveal that the probability of exhibiting 




for respondents with a low satisfaction with the current status of the economy (assessment 
of economy=00-03). The results of the Wald test indicate that for these low categories the 
odds-ratios of 2006 and 2012 are not the same, while for all higher categories they are the 
same.  This shows that trust in national parliament and trust in the European parliament 
have a different nature and agents are indeed able to distinguish between the two. This 
opposes the finding of Armingeon & Ceka (2013) who closely tie trust in national parliament 
and trust in the European parliament. The relationship between trust in these two 
institutions may also have broken off during the course of the sovereign debt crisis, in which 
the European institutions got another level of importance and were more in the spotlight of 
the media. This “break-up” can be better understood when looking at Graph 3. Especially in 
the lower categories a divergence between the two sorts of trust becomes visible. 
 
Graph 3: Comparison of densities of trust in parliament and trust in the European parliament in 2006 and 2012 
 
Notes: Trust in EP = Trust in the European parliament. Both variables are scaled 00-10. For further variable specification 
please refer to Appendix A. Kernel density function, Gaussian specification, bandwidth=0.5. For further information refer to 
Methodology A. 
 
This is in line with the result the descriptive statistics offered, in particular that trust in the 
European parliament is more permanently affected by the crisis than trust in national 
parliament. Roth (2009) argues similarly that the impact of the financial crisis on “the 
European Commission and the European parliament is not replicated at the national level” 
(p. 208).  
The evaluation of the impact of economic self-assessments on trust in the European 
parliament in 2006 and 2012 using the Wald test yields an increased, more negative effect. 
Over all four categories the respondents of 2012 are less likely to have a higher trust in the 






The effect of the Great Recession on the impact of economic self-assessment on trust in national and European parliaments 
  
Trust in national parliament Trust in the European parliament 
  
2006 2012 2006 2012 
  




























3.290** 3.002** 2.980** 2.733** 
(0.134) (0.121) (0.122) (0.111) 
Coping 
2.428** 2.060** 2.472** 1.999** 
(0.095) (0.079) (0.098) (0.077) 
Difficult 
1.981** 1.390** 2.218** 1.336** 







Notes: All results were obtained by the application of an ordered logistic regression. The model applied controls for demographic 
determinants and includes as explanatory variables (time*economic self-assessments) dummies in the periods 2002, 2004, 2006, 
2008, 2010 and 2012 (2014 is excluded). * Significantly different from zero at 5%-level. ** Significantly different from zero at 1%-
level. 
 
Therefore, both economic perceptions play an increased role during the economic crisis 
when regarding trust in the European parliament.  
Satisfaction with democracy is the most impacted dependent variable of assessments of the 
economy, with an economically very dissatisfied respondent being 99.3 % more likely to 
exhibit less satisfaction with democracy, than an economically very satisfied respondent.  
Over the course of the economic crisis this impact got weakened in almost all categories as 
table 12 column (1) and (2) reveal (besides satisfaction with economy = 10), corresponding 
with a higher satisfaction with democracy vis-à-vis assessments of economy. This result 
shows the diversity with which respondents react on different fields of the political 
spectrum. Furthermore, the problematic interpretation of the satisfaction with democracy 
variable has to be raised once again. The countries most affected by the sovereign debt crisis 
in Europe, the “PIIGS”, the effect of the Great Recession on the impact of assessments of the 
status of the economy on satisfaction with democracy has a similar nature as for the whole 
sample. The odds-ratios stay largely the same, and in the case they do not, the value for the 
2012 respondents is higher, corresponding to a higher probability of having a higher level of 
satisfaction with democracy. Considering the deep cuts to the political independence of 
these countries due to fiscal and financial restrictions, this is more than surprising (cf. table 
15).  




any of the other analyzed dependent variables (even more than redistribution, which is quite 
surprising). Table 13 column (1) and (2) show that this effect decreases over the course of 
the economic crisis. For all four categories the odds-ratios increase, corresponding to a 
higher probability to be more satisfied with the way democracy works in 2012 than in 2006, 
vis-à-vis economic self-assessments.  
 
4.2.2.2 Immigration 
The impact of economic perceptions on the variable Immigration: Economy stays either the 
same or is more positive in the crisis. In five of the eleven categories the odds-ratios stay 
statistically the same, while in six the odds-ratios increase (cf. table 16 column (1) and (2)). 
Respondents in 2012 evaluate therefore the impact of immigration on the economy more 
positively than in the reference year of 2006, given their level of satisfaction with the 
economy.  
The odds-ratios of the economic self-assessment decrease only slightly over the course of 
the crisis years (cf. table 14 column (1) and (2)). Besides the respondents living comfortably 
on their income in 2006 and 2012, who have statistically the same odds-ratios in evaluating 
the impact of immigration on the economy, all other categorized respondents exhibit a 
decreased probability in assessing immigration as being positive for the economy. This 
asymmetry in effects is similar to the one observed when analyzing trust in national 
parliament. 
Respondents evaluating whether immigration makes the country a better place to live in, are 
in 2012 over all categories more likely to have a more positive opinion than respondents in 
2006, vis-à-vis their assessments of the economy (cf. table 16 column (3) and (4)). 
Considering the development of the mean of Immigration: Country, this is hardly surprising, 
since despite the economic crisis, the mean decreased in 2010 only slightly referring to the 
basis year of 2006 and increased in 2012 even above the level of 2006. This development 
reflects also on the impact of economic self-assessments. While for Immigration: Economy 
the probability of evaluating immigration more positively decreased, for Immigration: 
Country it increased significantly among the respondents assessing their own economic 
situation as being “comfortable” or “coping on” (cf. table 14 column (3) and (4)). However, 
for respondents assessing their economic status as difficult, the probability to evaluate the 




For those respondents living in a very difficult situation the odds-ratio in 2006 is insignificant, 
hinting no change over the course of the Great recession. 
The last immigration variable which corresponds to the evaluation of the cultural impact of 
immigration yields yet another development. In 2012 the respondents of almost all 
categories evaluated the cultural impact of immigration more positively than their 
counterparts in 2006, vis-à-vis their assessments of the economy (cf. table 16 column (5) and 
(6)). The development of the impact of economic self-assessments can be compared to the 
impact they have on the variable Immigration: Country. The crisis made respondents, whose 
economic situation was good, more positive about the cultural impact of immigration (cf. 
table 14 column (5) and (6)). However, respondents exhibiting economic problems 
(economic self-assessment = difficult) have a decreased probability in seeing the impact of 
immigration on the cultural life as more positive. As in Immigration: Country, the 
respondents in the worst perceived economic conditions show no change between 2006 and 
2012 in evaluating Immigration: Culture.  
These different developments taken by the impact of economic perceptions on the three 
immigration variables show how complex and divers the attitudes towards immigration are. 
While the economic component of immigration is seen more critical in times of economic 
turmoil, the other two sides of immigration are seen completely different. This relationship 
between economic turmoil and the evaluation of the economic impact of immigration is 
straightforward, although the economic crisis was by no means influenced or aggravated by 
immigration. The anxiety for decreased living standards and the perceived threat immigrants 
pose to workers are triggering these sentiments (Goldstein & Peters. 2014). This anxiety 
reflects the development of the impact of egocentric economic perceptions on Immigration: 
Economy. Interestingly the development of economic self-assessments, concerning the other 
two immigration variables is split up into two directions. The economically well-situated 
respondents show an increasing trend in probability of evaluating these two immigration 
aspects positive, while respondents experiencing a difficult economic time exhibit an 
antithetic trend. Maybe this effect can be marked as a “zeitgeist” effect, in which a well 
situated, open minded and progressive part of the society is built and the economical more 
unfortunate part of society creates sentiments against immigrants. This conclusion would be 
in line with the political trends we experience right now in Europe. Surely for a more 





The impact of assessments of the economy on preferences for redistribution did change 
during the crisis in the lower categories (assessment of the economy = 0-2) towards a higher 
probability of demanding less redistribution (cf. table 12 column (3) and (4)). For the more 
satisfied respondents with the status of the economy (assessment of the economy = 6-10), 
the picture gets reversed towards a higher probability of agreeing to further measures of 
redistribution.  
The analysis of the impact of economic self-assessments regarding redistribution yields yet 
another situation, as table 13 column (3) and (4) display. The economic well-situated 
(“comfortable” and “coping on”) exhibit a higher probability in agreeing with further 
measures of redistribution in the crisis year 2012. While for the respondents perceiving their 
situation as “difficult” or “very difficult” the odds-ratios do not change over the course of the 
Great Recession. The crisis seems to have triggered an increased sense of altruism, in which 






















This paper has investigated the impact of assessments of the economy and economic self-
assessment on social preferences and attitudes. Furthermore, this article provides an 
extensive analysis whether and to which extent this impact of economic perceptions 
changed over the course of the Great Recession. Employing the rich and detailed data set of 
the European Social Survey provided extremely precise results. 
Evaluating the development of means of the investigated variables yields insights in the 
responsiveness of social preferences and attitudes, and economic perceptions to times of 
economic turmoil. While assessments of the economy experienced a crash in 2008, 
economic self-assessments only decreased slightly over the course of the economic 
recession. Trust in policy decreased considerably during the crisis, while attitudes towards 
immigration were on a stable level, or decreased slightly. The respondents favoured 
measures of redistribution increasingly in the economic recession, sustaining the trend which 
started already in the beginning of my observation period. Furthermore, respondents’ 
opinion about refugees changed from 2002 to 2014 in a positive direction.  
The results obtained by the ordered logit regression underline the importance of economic 
perceptions for the formation of social preferences and attitudes. Especially in the formation 
of political trust and satisfaction with democracy assessments of the economy dominate. 
Satisfaction with democracy is the variable most influenced by both economic assessments. 
The results indicate the deep cut going through the society, where respondents being very 
dissatisfied with the current status of the economy are 99.3% more likely to be less satisfied 
with the way democracy works, than respondents being very satisfied with the economy. The 
significance of these results is no “corner” phenomenon. Even respondents who are 
somewhat satisfied with the economy (assessment of the economy = 5) are 90% more likely 
to be less satisfied with the way democracy works than respondents who answered 
assessment of the economy=10. But not only satisfaction with democracy is heavily 
influenced by economic assessments; all three branches of variables exhibit a highly 
significant impact of economic perceptions: politics, redistribution, and immigration and 
refugees.  
The analysis of whether and to what extent the impact of economic perceptions on these 




Assessments of the economy dropped heavily with the beginning of the crisis (about 25%), 
while none of the dependent variables decreased nearly as much. This indicates that the 
formation of social preferences and attitudes is slower than changes in economic 
perceptions, which react promptly to such a severe financial crash as in 2008. The amount of 
respondents answering that they are dissatisfied with the status of the economy 
(assessments of the economy = 0,1,2) doubled in the economic recession.  
Despite this development there are considerable changes in the impact of assessments of 
the economy on at least some of my variables. While for trust in parliament and satisfaction 
with democracy the respondents are more likely to have more trust or satisfaction in the 
Great Recession, vis-à-vis their economic assessments. Contrary to that, the probability of 
exhibiting more trust in the European parliament decreased for the respondents who are 
less satisfied with the economy. This finding combined with the development of the mean of 
trust in the European parliament, which seems to detach itself considerably of trust in 
national parliament, indicates that the Great Recession and especially the European 
Sovereign Debt crisis, lead to a more distinct evaluation of the European parliament. 
Scholars have argued that agents are not able to distinguish between national and supra-
national institutions (Anderson (1998), Armingeon & Ceka (2013), Schmitt (2005)). The 
results obtained lead more in the direction of Risse (2010), who detects a European identity 
in agents, which complements their national identities, or Roth (2009), who finds that trends 
in European institutions is not transmitted to trust in national institutions, or vice versa. 
 
Evaluating the impact of economic-self assessments yields more intuitive results. The odds-
ratios decreased for most of the analyzed variables during the crisis (cf. table 17). 
Respondents in any economic situation exhibited less trust in parliaments on the national 
and European level. The impact of economic self-assessments on two of the three 
immigration variables exhibits a very peculiar and interesting pattern (Immigration: Country, 
Immigration: Culture). While the odds-ratios for the respondents in a good financial situation 
increased, the odds-ratios for the “poorer” decreased. This indicates a widening crack in the 
society, in which the well-situated judge immigration more and more generous, while the 
economic “losers” of the development build up an increasing refusal of immigrants. In the 
evaluation of another topic the society seems to grow more together: redistribution. The 




redistribution than before the crisis, as well as respondents having a more positive view on 
the economic situation in their country.  
  
For future research it would be fruitful, if a longer time frame would be employed. 
Furthermore, it could be beneficial to investigate the same research questions only focusing 
on single countries. To investigate the refugee variable could be interesting when there is 





























6.1 Appendix A: Description of Variables 
 
Satisfaction with economy/Assessment of the economy: On the whole how satisfied are you 
  with the present state of the economy in [country]? (00- Extremely dissatisfied; 
  10- Extremely satisfied) 
Economic self-assessment: Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you 
  feel about your household's income nowadays? (01- Living comfortably on 
  present income; 02- Coping on present income; 03- Finding it difficult on 
  present income; 04- Finding it very difficult on present income) 
Trust in parliament: How much do you personally trust in [country]'s parliament? (00- No 
  trust at all; 10- Complete trust) 
Trust in European parliament: How much do you personally trust in the European  
  parliament? (00- No trust at all; 10- Complete trust) 
Satisfaction with democracy: On the whole. how satisfied are you with the way democracy 
  works in [country]? (00- Extremely dissatisfied. 10- Extremely satisfied) 
Immigration: Economy: Would you say that it is generally bad or good for [country]'s  
  economy that people  come to live here from other countries? (00- Bad for 
  economy; 10- Good for economy) 
Immigration: Country: Is [country] made a worse or better place to live by people coming to 
  live here from other countries? (00- Worse place to live; 10- Better place to 
  live) 
Immigration: Culture: Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or
  enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? (00- Cultural life 
  undermined; 10- Cultural life enriched) 
Redistribution: The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels. 
  (01- Agree strongly; 05- Disagree strongly) 
Refugees: Some people come to this country and apply for refugee status on the grounds that 
  they fear persecution in their own country. Please say how much you agree or 
  disagree that: 'the government should be generous in judging people's  
  applications for refugee status'. (01- Agree strongly; 05- Disagree strongly) 




Left-right scale: In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. where would you 
  place yourself on this card. where 0 means the left and 10 means the right? 
Sex:   01- Male. 00- Female 
Unemployment history: Have you ever been unemployed and seeking work for a period of 
  more than 3 months? (01- Yes; 00- No; (excluding all respondents currently 
  unemployed)) 
Born in Country: 01- Respondent is born in corresponding country; 00- Otherwise 
Member of Minority: 01- Respondent belongs to minority; 00- Otherwise 
Age:   Age of respondent 
























6.2. Appendix B: Tables 
Table 9 
Composition of sample 
 
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Total 
Albania 




Austria x x x 
   
x 4 
Belgium x x x x x x x 7 
Bulgaria 
  










x x x x 
 
4 
Czech Republic x x 
 
x x x x 6 
Denmark x x x x x x x 7 
Estonia 
 
x x x x x x 6 
Finland x x x x x x x 7 
France x x x x x x x 7 
Germany x x x x x x x 7 















Ireland x x x x x x x 7 
Israel x 
  














   
x 
   
1 
Lithuania 




Luxemburg x x 
     
2 
Netherlands x x x x x x x 7 
Norway x x x x x x x 7 
Poland x x x x x x x 7 




   
x 









x x x x x 
 
5 
Slovenia x x x x x x x 7 
Spain x x x x x x 
 
6 
Sweden x x x x x x x 7 






   
2 





x x x x x 
 
5 
# observations 24532 27073 27254 35791 33239 36074 21742 
 Notes: Minimum amount of observations per country and year: 26. Maximum amount of observations per country and 









The effect of assessments of the economy on trust in the European parliament sorted by region 
  
EMU EU non EMU All 
  









































0.060** 0.071** 0.125** 0.088** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
1 
0.105** 0.119** 0.187** 0.145** 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) 
2 
0.158** 0.178** 0.252** 0.208** 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) 
3 
0.224** 0.253** 0.346** 0.291** 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.011) 
4 
0.307** 0.346** 0.451** 0.390** 
(0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.015) 
5 
0.331** 0.375** 0.480** 0.419** 
(0.023) (0.019) (0.021) (0.016) 
6 
0.499** 0.558** 0.673** 0.610** 
(0.034) (0.028) (0.030) (0.023) 
7 
0.618** 0.693** 0.781** 0.735** 
(0.042) (0.035) (0.035) (0.027) 
8 
0.699** 0.814** 0.933 0.854** 
(0.048) (0.042) (0.042) (0.032) 
9 
0.884 0.958 0.992 0.972 
(0.068) (0.055) (0.049) (0.041) 
very satisfied 1 1 1 1 
Demographic Variables 
 Education 1.033** 1.033** 1.027** 1.030** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Left-right scale 
1.032** 1.025** 1.001 1.016** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Unemployment history 
0.910** 0.903** 0.922** 0.913** 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) 
Sex 
0.867** 0.864** 0.864** 0.865** 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) 
Born in country 
0.745** 0.754** 0.838** 0.792** 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.012) 
Member of minority 
1.050 1.041** 1.097** 1.084** 
(0.030) (0.025) (0.030) (0.021) 
Age 
0.944** 0.947** 0.962** 0.952** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Age squared 
1.001** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pseudo R2 0.040 0.041 0.034 0.037 
Number of Observations 113747 166364 91958 205705 
Notes: For description of variables please refer to Appendix A. Column 1: Only Euro-zone 
members. Column 2: Only EU members. Column 3: Only non Euro-zone members. Column (4): 
All countries contained in sample included. * Significantly different from zero at 5%-level. ** 











Gini Coefficient in Europe  
 
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 
EU (27 countries) 
 
30,3 31 30,4 30,4 30,9 
Euro area (18 countries) 30,7 29,3 30,5 30,2 30,3 30,9 
Austria 25,8 25,3 27,7 28,3 27,6 27,6 
Belgium 26,1 27,8 27,5 26,6 26,5 25,9 
Bulgaria 
 
31,2 35,9 33,2 33,6 35,4 
Croatia 
   
31,6 30,9 30,2 
Cyprus 
 
28,8 29 30,1 31 34,8 
Czech Republic   25,3 24,7 24,9 24,9 25,1 
Denmark 23,9 23,7 25,1 26,9 28,1 27,5 
Estonia 37,4 33,1 30,9 31,3 32,5 35,6 
Finland 25,5 25,9 26,3 25,4 25,9 25,6 
France 28,2 27,3 29,8 29,8 30,5 29,2 
Germany   26,8 30,2 29,3 28,3 30,7 
Greece 33 34,3 33,4 32,9 34,3 34,5 
Hungary 
 
33,3 25,2 24,1 26,9 27,9 
Iceland 24,1 26,3 27,3 25,7 24 22,7 
Ireland 31,5 31,9 29,9 30,7 29,9 30,7 
Italy 32,9 32,1 31,2 31,7 32,4 32,4 
Latvia 
 
38,9 37,5 35,9 35,7 35,5 
Lithuania 
 
35 34,5 37 32 35 
Luxembourg 26,5 27,8 27,7 27,9 28 28,7 
Malta 
 
27,1 28,1 28,6 27,1 27,7 
Netherlands   26,4 27,6 25,5 25,4 26,2 
Norway 25,2 29,2 25,1 23,6 22,5 23,5 
Poland   33,3 32 31,1 30,9 30,8 
Portugal 37,8 37,7 35,8 33,7 34,5 34,5 
Romania 
  
36 33,3 33,2 34,7 
Slovakia 
 
28,1 23,7 25,9 25,3 26,1 
Slovenia   23,7 23,4 23,8 23,7 25 
Spain 31 31,9 32,4 33,5 34,2 34,7 
Switzerland     31,1 29,6 28,8   
Sweden 23 24 24 24,1 24,8 25,4 
United Kingdom 
 


















The effect of the Great Recession on the impact of assessments of the economy on satisfaction with democracy 
and redistribution 
  
Satisfaction with democracy Redistribution 
  
2006 2012 2006 2012 
  









































0.007** 0.012** 0.355** 0.431** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.036) (0.038) 
1 
0.015** 0.027** 0.411** 0.566** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.045) (0.052) 
2 
0.026** 0.041** 0.563** 0.640** 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.053) (0.056) 
3 
0.044** 0.071** 0.684** 0.698** 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.061) (0.060) 
4 
0.071** 0.119** 0.861 0.762** 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.076) (0.066) 
5 
0.096** 0.158** 0.850* 0.823* 
(0.009) (0.014) (0.074) (0.071) 
6 
0.152** 0.259** 1.020 0.875 
(0.014) (0.023) (0.089) (0.075) 
7 
0.241** 0.381** 1.063 0.946 
(0.021) (0.034) (0.091) (0.082) 
8 
0.384** 0.532** 1.231* 1.016 
(0.034) (0.048) (0.107) (0.090) 
9 
0.583** 0.770** 1.385** 1.130 







Notes: All results were obtained by the application of an ordered logistic regression. The model applied controls for 
demographic determinants and includes as explanatory variables (time*assessments of the economy) dummies in 
the periods 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012 (2014 is excluded).  Redistribution is coded as follows: 1 – 
agree strongly, 5 – disagree strongly. For further description of variables please refer to Appendix A. * Significantly 
different from zero at 5%-level. ** Significantly different from zero at 1%-level. 
Table 13 
The effect of the Great Recession on the impact of economic self-assessment on satisfaction with democracy and redistribution 
  
Satisfaction with democracy Redistribution 
  
2006 2012 2006 2012 
  





























2.366** 2.677** 2.904** 2.445** 
(0.096) (0.107) (0.128) (0.106) 
Coping 
1.653** 1.894** 1.925** 1.657** 
(0.064) (0.072) (0.082) (0.069) 
Difficult 
1.190** 1.289** 1.356** 1.317** 
(0.053) (0.052) (0.066) (0.059) 
Very difficult 




 Notes: All results were obtained by the application of an ordered logistic regression. The model applied controls for 
demographic determinants and includes as explanatory variables (time*economic self-assessments) dummies in the periods 
2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012 (2014 is excluded). * Significantly different from zero at 5%-level. ** Significantly 




   Table 14 




Economy Country Culture 
  
2006 2012 2006 2012 2006 2012 
  





























2.489** 2.535** 2.156** 2.713** 1.825** 2.132** 
(0.103) (0.103) (0.089) (0.111) (0.075) (0.086) 
Coping 
1.841** 1.717** 1.727** 1.845** 1.469** 1.587** 
(0.073) (0.067) (0.069) (0.072) (0.058) (0.061) 
Difficult 
1.510** 1.298** 1.505** 1.391** 1.340** 1.254** 
(0.069) (0.054) (0.069) (0.058) (0.061) (0.052) 
Very difficult 






 Notes: All results were obtained by the application of an ordered logistic regression. The model applied controls for 
demographic determinants and includes as explanatory variables (time*economic self-assessments) dummies in the 
periods 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012 (2014 is excluded). * Significantly different from zero at 5%-level. ** 
Significantly different from zero at 1%-level. For details of variables please refer to Appendix A. 
 
Table 15 
The effect of the Great Recession on the impact of assessments of the 
economy on satisfaction with democracy in the “PIIGS” countries 
  














































































Notes: For further specification of variables please refer to Appendix A. * 
Significantly different from zero at 5%-level. ** Significantly different from 











Economy Country Culture 
  
2006 2012 2006 2012 2006 2012 
  









































0.098** 0.114** 0.097** 0.135** 0.203** 0.239** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.021) (0.021) 
1 
0.144** 0.147** 0.148** 0.178** 0.249** 0.282** 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.026) (0.026) 
2 
0.180** 0.200** 0.188** 0.221** 0.267** 0.324** 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.025) (0.028) 
3 
0.214** 0.245** 0.218** 0.265** 0.305** 0.394** 
(0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.027) (0.034) 
4 
0.296** 0.290** 0.292** 0.328** 0.412** 0.455** 
(0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.036) (0.039) 
5 
0.325** 0.339** 0.307** 0.362** 0.388** 0.468** 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.027) (0.031) (0.033) (0.040) 
6 
0.397** 0.456** 0.385** 0.501** 0.476** 0.580** 
(0.035) (0.040) (0.033) (0.043) (0.041) (0.050) 
7 
0.491** 0.559** 0.442** 0.577** 0.552** 0.637** 
(0.043) (0.049) (0.038) (0.050) (0.047) (0.055) 
8 
0.579** 0.618** 0.503** 0.630** 0.615** 0.671** 
(0.051) (0.056) (0.044) (0.056) (0.053) (0.059) 
9 
0.619** 0.751** 0.466** 0.670** 0.634** 0.739** 








(0.093) (0.067) (0.092) 
Notes: For further specification of variables please refer to Appendix A. * Significantly different from zero at 5%-level. ** 
























Notes: Displayed are odds-ratios of economic self-assessments when regressed towards the independent variables. For 
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